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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the effects of foreign banks on developing countries’ bank performance. We study 
this relationship from a different perspective by focusing on Chile, an emerging market with strong 
institutions. The results from dynamic panel regressions on hand-collected financial statement data 
from 2005 to 2014 indicate that foreign banks improve banking sector competitiveness, reduce the 
volatility of returns, and increase commercial and consumption loans. The overall evidence suggests 
that, in the presence of solid institutions, foreign banks improve the banking sector in developing 
countries. Therefore, public policies on foreign banks should be more effective when accompanied by 
advances in institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
Studying the effects of financial institutions in a multi-country analysis posits several challenges that 
can jeopardize the validity of results. A within-country study can mitigate the risk of heterogeneous 
sample selection and provide an unbiased insight into the link between institutional development, 
finance, and economic growth. Our paper adopts this approach and focuses on Chile, a developing 
country with an institutional framework comparable to that of developed countries. Another element 
that permeates the debate on the performance of foreign banks is the level of economic development in 
the host country. Previous literature (Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga 2001; Lensink and Hermes 
2004) shows that foreign banks behave differently in developing countries than in developed countries. 
Nevertheless, by selecting a country with a GDP per capita 70 % smaller than the GDP per capita of an 
OECD country but with a similar level of institutional development, we are able to isolate the behavior of 
foreign banks in the presence of strong institutions. Furthermore, the presence of a competitive banking 
system allows for testing the effects of foreign banks in a developing country with strong institutions. By 
controlling for institutional development and competitiveness, this paper contributes to the debate of 
the effects of foreign banks on the banking and economic development of an emerging market.   
The Chilean economy has distinguished itself from other Latin American countries due to its higher 
level of institutional development and macroeconomic stability.  Beginning in 1974, the government 
started implementing market friendly reforms, which led to economic growth and stability. The three 
main goals of the reforms were the reduction of inflation, a decrease in the participation of the 
government in the economy, and economic liberalization. However, the path to economic growth faced 
some challenges as the country entered into a severe recession in 1982. As with many economies in the 
region that were struggling to curb inflation, the government relied on the dollarization of the economy. 
However, this strategy backfired and Chile’s GDP fell by 14%.  The crisis had a heavy impact on banks, 
which were eventually nationalized by the government. Further economic changes included tax and 
labor reforms that significantly reduced poverty and inequality. The government implemented taxes on 
short-term capital flows and foreign currency loans in an attempt to decrease the volatility of foreign 
capital.  These measures alleviated the negative effects of the 1997 Asian crisis, but the country still 
suffered a minor recession.  In this paper, we focus on the banking sector and institutional development 
in Chile from 2005 to 2014. 
Prior to the 1982-83 banking crisis, the Chilean financial system was dominated by a few major 
banks and was weakly regulated. After the crisis, the government implemented major reforms and in 
1990 foreign banks began to operate in the country. The Spanish banks Santander and BBV along with 
Scotiabank had a strong presence in Chile prior to Citigroup’s acquisition of the Bank of Chile in 2008. 
From the early 1990s to the present, about half of the banks operating in Chile are foreign. There have 
been positive effects derived from the introduction of foreign banks. In particular, they have 
implemented lending policies that are based on an objective screening of borrowers, which helped to 
modernize the banking system (Edmunds 2007). Interestingly, even though Chile was an early adopter of 
institutional changes and modernization of the financial sector in the region, it has not implemented any 
major reforms since 1997 (Vallejos, 2017).  
The level of competition during the period 1997 to 2002 was very high and those banks with the 
lowest marginal costs were lending the most. The number of banks decreased from 32 in 1997 to 26 in 
2002. Foreign banks also decreased from 18 to 14. However, between 2002 and 2005 there was a wave 
of mergers and acquisitions and the level of competition decreased. One of the most important 
acquisitions occurred when the Spanish bank Santander purchased Banco Santiago in 2002 (Oda and 
Silva, 2010). Given that credit allocation was provided by the larger banks, smaller banks started to relax 
their screening policies and expanded their client base. The level of competition in the period between 
2007 and 2009 was similar to the period between 2002 and 2005 and the total number of banks barely 
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changed. In 2008, there were 13 domestic banks and 12 foreign banks (Piedrabuena, 2013). Even though 
the number of domestic and foreign banks remained constant between 2002 and 2009, the level of 
competition increased because more Chileans were obtaining credit and banks increased their portfolio 
of consumption lending. The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 posed a big risk for the Chilean banking 
system given that Spanish banks in 2008 had more than 50% of the foreign bank’s consolidated claims 
on Chile (Chan-Lau, 2010). Nevertheless, Spanish banks were among the European banks that suffered 
the least from the financial crisis. 
Throughout this decade, Chilean banking system can be differentiated from other countries in the 
region because they have a larger portion of institutional investors. Having a significant number of 
sophisticated investors creates a more stable source of income that allows them to have a large ratio of 
loans to deposits (IMF, 2014). This ratio is more pronounced for smaller banks due to their high reliance 
on institutional depositors. After the financial crisis of 2007-2008, Basel III was developed as a set of 
parameters to strengthen the financial system. Among those parameters, capital adequacy ratio 
requirements were increased to 10.5 percent, from 8 percent under Basel I. Since 2011, Chilean banks 
have been very successful in maintaining a capital adequacy ratio of 13 percent. Currently, Chile is in the 
process of formally adopting Basel III as part of their banking laws, which in addition will increase the 
independence of the authority that supervises the banking system (Rojas-Suarez, 2015). 
One of the main arguments against the presence of foreign banks in emerging markets has been 
that foreign banks lend mostly to large corporations and wealthy individuals. As a consequence, local 
banks start lending to risky clients, which deteriorates their lending portfolio. However, the Chilean case 
presents a more complex picture. The presence of foreign banks along with the consolidation of the 
banking system has created segments in which both local and foreign banks compete. Some papers have 
emphasized the heterogeneity of the Chilean banking system and categorized banks according to their 
size and operations (Wigodski and Torres, 2004; Jara, Luna and Oda, 2007). Jara and Oda (2014) provide 
a systematic approach where banks can be separated in seven clusters. Banks have characteristics 
pertaining to more than one cluster but they mostly operate within their own groups. The first group is 
composed of large multinational banks and it includes Banco Santander (Spain), Banco de Chile (U.S.), 
BCI (domestic), and Banco del Estado (domestic – government owned). The second group refers to 
medium sized multinational banks such as Scotiabank (Canada) and BBVA (Spain). The third cluster 
comprises medium sized banks that have a niche market (mostly wealthy individuals). These banks are 
Banco Itaú (Brazil), Corpbanca (domestic), Bice (domestic), Internacional (domestic), and Security 
(domestic). In the fourth group are banks that specialize in retail banking. Three banks occupy this 
category: Falabella (domestic), Paris (domestic), and Ripley (domestic). The fifth group has treasury 
banks (those providing financial services to foreign companies) and includes Deutsche Bank (Germany) 
and JP Morgan (U.S.). The sixth group focuses on international trade and three banks dominate this 
category: BNA (Argentina), Banco do Brasil (Brazil), and Tokyo (Japan). Finally, HSBC (UK), Consorcio 
(domestic), Penta (domestic), and Rabobank (Dutch) are categorized as banks that specialize in financial 
services.  
The Chilean banking system continues to evolve and most recently Chinese banks have started 
operations in Chile. China Construction Bank entered the country in 2014 and its goal is to become the 
largest foreign bank in Chile. Their main areas are foreign trade, currency exchange, and corporate 
lending and they plan to focus on Chilean companies that do business in China (Radic, 2017). The 
presence of this new foreign bank adheres to the narrative of a heterogeneous banking system, where 
banks focus on a specific sector rather than displace local banks. Foreign banks are also attracted to 
Chile because they want to use it as a regional platform for their Latin American operations. The political 
and economic stability of Chile, along with its developed institutional framework is appealing to foreign 
banks. Furthermore, Chile is a strong exporting country and foreign banks want to participate in that 
area (Von Oldershausen, 2016). 
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Foreign direct investment has traditionally targeted the mining sector, which accounted for 57 
percent of FDI from 1990 to 1995. In the second half of the 1990s, President Patricio Aylwin privatized 
areas of the economy such as telecommunications and energy and more FDI flowed to electricity, gas 
and water (Salcedo and Akoorie, 2013). During the 1990s, FDI grew in Chile from $700 million to $9 
billion at the end of the decade. Even though the mining sector remained the main recipient of FDI 
throughout the 2000s with a stock of $24 billion in 2009, other areas of the economy such as retailing 
and financial services also accounted for a significant amount of FDI. By 2009, FDI flows to the country 
amounted to $12.7 billion and the main investors were the United States, Canada, and Spain (Alatorre 
and Razo, 2010). FDI flows decreased by 16 percent after the financial crisis but Chile did not suffer a 
major contraction due to the strength of its mining industry. In the present decade, mining continues to 
be the main destination of FDI and the US is the main investor while the Netherlands replaced Spain as 
the second largest investor in the country (U.S. Department of State, 2016). In general, Chile has been 
very open towards foreign capital and multinational corporations receive the same treatment as 
domestic companies. 
The state of development of the financial sector is associated with the level of economic 
development in a country. There is a debate regarding whether economic development leads to a higher 
level of financial development or whether a strong financial structure is necessary as an engine of 
economic growth (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Luintel and Khan, 1999). Furthermore, the 
debate has evolved to differentiate between the banking sector and the stock market (Allen, 1993; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996). It could also be that the banking sector is the initial state of 
financial development and, as the economy grows and institutions solidify, the stock market becomes a 
more important source of financing for the economy. Even though the stock market allows for a more 
diversified ownership, it requires regulatory agencies overseeing the quality of listed companies. In our 
analysis, solid institutions in Chile, measured by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
allow foreign banks to enhance economic development by promoting competitiveness and 
complementary services. However, at the corporate level, the country presents another picture. Chile’s 
largest conglomerate ranks low in terms of corporate governance and transparency.  The perception 
that Chileans have in regard to shareholder protection is amongst the lowest for OECD countries 
(Brandao Marques, 2016). This is particularly troublesome given that conglomerates represent the 
majority of the capital on the Santiago Stock Exchange (OECD, 2011). This lack of investor protection is a 
major source of the lack of liquidity of the exchange. The World Economic forum elaborates the Global 
Competitiveness Report, which measures the perception of more than 3,000 executives from the 
country where they work in terms of financial disclosure and availability of information. Chile has not 
ranked better than 30 from a sample of 140 countries from 2010 to 2016 (World Economic Forum, 
2016). Even though Chile has a strong institutional framework in several areas, it definitely lacks in terms 
of corporate governance (Brandao Marques, Gelos, and Melgar, 2013). 
The study of institutions and finance has been pervaded by the work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998), who study the legal framework that protects stockholders from the 
inherent agency conflict of managers. They find that common law provides better protection for 
individual investors but civil law countries compensate investors by requiring mandatory dividends. The 
effects of institutions on banks can be approached as an asymmetric problem where borrowers possess 
more knowledge than the lender about future cash flows. Adverse selection is diminished when banks 
screen potential borrowers and moral hazard decreases when banks can repossess collateral. However, 
screening requires availability of information about the borrower such as a credit is to expect financial 
intermediaries to fulfill their role as engines of economic growth. 
The influence of foreign banks in the economic development of a country has been the source of an 
academic debate. Foreign banks can help an economy by providing lower interest rates, better business 
practices, and act as a cushion against domestic sources of volatility, given their international operations 
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(Goldberg, Dages, and Kinney, 2000). However, in the financial 2007-2009 financial crisis, foreign banks 
affected the host countries’ economies by exporting the volatility that was generated by the home 
country recession. Peek and Rosengreen (2000) argue that foreign banks can export risks from their 
home countries. On the other hand, a positive aspect about foreign banks is that they are regulated not 
only by the host country but also by their home country. Thus, if the host country has weak institutions, 
the local clients of the bank will benefit from the imported regulation and supervision. Some of the 
arguments against the presence of foreign banks in emerging markets is that they lend only to the most 
reliable borrowers, they facilitate capital flight, and they may respond to their home country’s 
government rather than the local authorities (Goldberg, Dages, and Kinney, 2000). In the case of Mexico, 
foreign banks have not followed the government’s desires of becoming an engine of economic 
development. Haber and Musacchio (2005) state that foreign banks avoid commercial loans in Mexico 
because it is hard to recover their assets. It is argued that foreign banks have a weak environment of 
property rights enforcement, which has forced them to focus mostly on consumption loans and fees as 
the main source of income rather than commercial loans. In the case of Chile, foreign banks have taken 
advantage of the strong institutions and they provide commercial loans and increase the 
competitiveness of the financial system.  
With hand collected data on financial statements from 2005 to 2014 we test the effects of 
institutions and foreign banks on the competitiveness in the banking system, volatility of returns, and 
lending portfolio. Given the consistent high scores of governance in Chile, we can analyze the effect of 
foreign banks in a developing country with strong institutions and competitive banking system. We 
observe that, in the presence of strong institutions, foreign banks improve the competitiveness in the 
system, as evidenced by lower net interest margins. A frequent argument against the presence of 
foreign banks is the instability that they import from their home countries and parent companies. 
However, in the case of developing countries, foreign banks can serve as a source of stability if the host 
country suffers from a volatile economy and the business cycles of the home and host countries are 
uncorrelated. We find that foreign banks decrease the volatility of returns even after controlling for 
macroeconomic variables like inflation and GDP per capita.  In the last set of tests, we provide some 
evidence to show that foreign banks are increasing their allocation of commercial and consumer loans 
but there is some mixed evidence with housing loans. Furthermore, there is a negative correlation 
between commercial loans and consumption and housing loans. Along with a dynamic panel analysis we 
observe market segmentation where some banks are providing commercial loans while another group 
of banks prefer to provide consumption and housing loans. An important policy implication from these 
results is that developing countries should encourage the presence of foreign banks in their country. 
Governments can benefit from foreign banks by providing regulation and supervision that enhance 
competition in the banking sector.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional development 
measures. Section 3 develops testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and methodology and 
presents summary statistics. Section 5 discusses the results of institutional development and banking in 
Chile. Section 6 provides the conclusion. 
 
2. Institutional measures and macroeconomic environment 
The institutional development of a country influences the behavior of banks. If there is a weak 
regulatory system that inhibits the enforcement of contracts, then banks will be less willing to provide 
credit. Chile possesses some advantages for a within-country study on development and banking. Even 
though Chile is a developing country, it has institutions that have been continuously strengthened to 
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improve the economy. Furthermore, government agencies provide information on several areas of the 
economy including financial statements for all banks that are part of the financial system. 
Table 1 provides a macroeconomic snapshot of Chile, Latin America and Caribbean, and the OECD 
countries. The first variable is the domestic credit provided by the financial sector. The OECD countries 
provide two times their GDP in credit and Chile 115% of its GDP. Latin American credit lags far behind, 
although it has grown for the past decade and has almost reached 80% of its GDP in 1980. In terms of 
GDP per capita, there is a big gap between the OECD countries and the rest of the group. However, 
there appears to be no economic growth for Chile, Latina America, and the OECD between 2011 and 
2014.  Total population has been growing slowly for all three regions. Inflation in the past decade is 
another indicator that shows the disparity between Chile and Latin America. In Chile, the average 
inflation in the period was 3.36%, which is 1.14 percentage points below inflation in Latin American and 
1.19 p.p. above OECD’s. At the macroeconomic level, we observe that Chile has a performance between 
the OECD countries and the rest of Latin America. Even though the country has made major economic 
reforms and is an OECD member since 2010, its performance is still not on par with the OECD average. 
This is particularly notorious with the GDP per capita panel observations. 
 [Insert Table 1 Here] 
We include an aggregate institutional measure that consists of an equally-weighted average of the 
six Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) developed by the World Bank. The Governance Index has 
been previously used to study the determinants of long term economic growth (Easterly and Levine, 
2003; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2004; Alonso, 2011). The WGI project has gathered data on 215 
countries from 1996 to 2014. The project’s goal is to obtain a measurement of the government’s ability 
to implement policies, regulate itself, and be esteemed by its citizens. The six indicators are built from 
more than 30 sources that describe the perceptions of different members of society about their 
government. The first WGI indicator is voice and accountability. This index measures the ability of 
citizens to select their government and participate in society.  The second variable is political stability 
and absence of violence/terrorism. The variable measures the perceptions of society on the likelihood of 
political instability. The third variable is government effectiveness and it measures perceptions on 
quality of public services, implementation of policies, and credibility of the government. Fourth is 
regulatory quality, which measures perceptions on the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement policies. Fifth is rule of law, which consists of confidence in quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, courts, and likelihood of crime and violence. This variable is of particular interest to the 
banking system because if banks do not believe that the judicial system will enforce contracts and 
property rights, then banks will be less likely to provide loans.  The last indicator is control of corruption. 
This variable measures perceptions on the government’s pursuance of private benefits; it also takes into 
account the manipulation of the state by elites and private interests. The highest observations during 
the period are from Finland and Denmark in 2006, with a value for control of corruption of 2.55. The 
lowest observation belongs to Somalia in 2009, with a value for political stability of -3.32. These 
indicators provide a very strong argument for studying a Latin American country with strong institutions. 
Chile’s scores are almost identical to OECD’s. The scores of Latin America show the weak institutional 
framework in which the rest of the region operates.  
3. Related literature and hypotheses development 
The level of institutional development has a strong influence on the financial sector of a country. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Levine (1999) find that the differences in legal systems across countries 
affect the financial system. In particular, in countries where creditors are well protected by the judicial 
system, there are stronger financial intermediaries. Levine (1999) also finds that the financial system is 
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more developed when borrowers provide reliable information and the government enforces contracts. 
La Porta et al. (1998) show that common-law countries have the strongest protection to investors. Given 
the information asymmetry that prevails between creditors and borrowers, these governments have 
created institutions to decrease the information gap. If there is information about borrowers in the form 
of credit bureaus, then adverse selection is reduced whereas enforceability of contracts reduces moral 
hazard. 
Even though the effects of law on finance have been generally accepted, the interaction between 
institutions, finance and growth has been more difficult to establish.  King and Levine (1993) test 
Schumpeter’s affirmation that finance promotes economic growth. They compile a sample of 80 
countries and conclude that the financial industry promotes growth through the accumulation and 
efficient use of capital. Levine and Zervos (1996) study 49 countries from 1976 through 1993 and find 
that well-developed stock markets and banking systems promote economic growth. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998) perform a growth simulation on firms from 30 different countries and provide 
evidence that the highest growing firms are from countries that have strong stock markets and legal 
systems.  
However, Lucas (1988) believes that finance does not have such a strong effect on development. 
Furthermore, there is a stream of literature that criticizes the methodology of previous studies in 
determining the importance of finance. Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989) discuss the risk of sample 
selection bias that can lead to spurious results. Quah (1993) states that pooled regressions incorporate 
countries with different growth paths, which weaken any generalization. Luintel and Khan (1999) use a 
VAR analysis and find a bidirectional causal relationship between finance and growth. Christopoulos and 
Tsionas (2004) argue that cross-sectional data leads to spurious correlations and finance affects growth 
only on the long run. 
The research difficulties arising from cross-country data have reinvigorated a within-country 
approach. Berkowitz et al. (2014) study privatized state-banks in Russia and find that those banks with 
no political connections in areas with strong property rights tend to increase growth. Berkowitz et al. 
(2015) analyze a property law that was approved in China in 2006 and gave creditors more rights over 
the collateral and gave private firms more power against expropriation by local governments. After 
property rights were enhanced, firms experienced economic growth. Brown, Cookson, and Heimer 
(2016) study the effects of state courts and tribal courts on Native American reservations. They find that 
reservations that are assigned to state courts, which are more predictable than tribal courts when 
enforcing contracts, develop stronger credit markets and have a higher income. These studies stress the 
advantages of examining the interaction between law and finance in one country. By focusing on Chile, 
we can isolate the effects of foreign banking in an emerging Latin American country with strong 
institutions.  
In the presence of asymmetric information, banks play a fundamental role of screening creditors 
and allocating capital. In the stock market, free riders can benefit from active shareholders which may 
discourage investing in the exchange. Banks do not suffer from the free rider problem because they are 
the sole beneficiary of creditor screening. In their analysis of financial intermediaries, Boot and Thakor 
(1997) underlie the differences between the type of borrowers and the financial institution that best 
serves their interests. If the industry in which the borrower operates is heavily monitored by the 
government, then the stock market will prevail. However, if there is a need for constant monitoring, 
borrowers will use banks. Furthermore, if there is an absence of collateral, borrowers will use the 
venture capital industry for funds. Beck and Levine (2004) also find that both the stock market and 
banks provide complementary financial services that increase economic growth. There are other 
economic conditions such as the competitiveness in the banking sector that will determine the influence 
of the financial system in the economy. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2004) analyze the effects 
of bank concentration on several countries and show that a heavily contracted banking industry limits 
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the access to finance, but only in the presence of weak institutions. Interestingly, they find that the 
presence of foreign banks and a credit registry decreases the negative effects of concentration. 
We test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Foreign banks will decrease the net interest margin. 
If foreign banks increase the competitiveness of the financial system, then banks’ profits as 
measured by the net interest margin should experience a decline. In their comprehensive analysis of 80 
countries between 1988 and 1995, Claessens et al. (2001) find that foreign banks decrease the interest 
rate margins of domestic banks. Lensink and Hermes (2004) incorporate the effects of economic 
development and find that in less developed economies, the presence of foreign banks increases the 
spreads of domestic banks. Peria and Mody (2004) study the effect of foreign banks in Latin America and 
find that when there is competition, there is a decrease in the net interest margin. Berger, Hasan, and 
Zhou (2009) observe the effect of foreign ownership on Chinese banks and find that foreign ownership 
improves efficiency. Jeon, Olivero, and Wu (2011) also conclude that foreign banks in Asia and Latin 
America increase competition. However, Moguillansky, Stuart, and Vergara (2004) argue that foreign 
banks can exploit the economic conditions in the host country and increase their net interest margin.  
The effect of foreign banks on a local economy is heavily dependent on the level of development of 
the host country’s institutions. Engermann and Sokoloff (1997) perform a historical study on the effect 
of factor endowments in the New World economies and find that better institutions decrease interest 
margins. Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004) provide evidence that institutions that protect 
property rights and promote economic freedom decrease net interest margin. Naceur and Omran (2011) 
find that banks have a lower cost of intermediation when the banking system and the stock market are 
well developed. Additionally, they show that corruption increases net interest margin while better law 
and order decreases costs. In a more detailed analysis, Bianco, Jappelli, and Pagano (2005) develop a 
model where institutional development is more ambiguous. Improvements in judicial efficiency increase 
lending, but the net effect on interest rate depends on competition. Chen and Liao (2011) expand the 
study on institutions and foreign banks by incorporating the institutions and economic development of 
the foreign bank’s home country. They find that the spread is thinner when the foreign banks come 
from a developing country but the home country’s macroeconomic environment has no effect on the 
spread. They also find that better financial regulation and supervision in the home country has an 
increasing effect on spreads. In regards to host country characteristics, better governance, higher GDP, 
and more competition lowers the interest margin but inflation has the opposite effect.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Foreign banks will decrease a bank’s volatility of net interest margin and the volatility of 
return on assets. In addition, foreign banks will increase the z-score. 
If foreign banks suffer from more information asymmetry than their domestic competitors then they 
will increase the volatility of returns. Goldberg et al. (2000) and Peek and Rosengreen (2000) argue that 
foreign banks can be a source of instability if there is a financial crisis in their home country that requires 
a capital flight to the parent companies. Goldberg et al. (2000) state that foreign banks cherry-pick the 
most profitable borrowers and this allow them to suffer from less volatility. Wu et al. (2011) show that 
foreign banks serve as a cushion to contractionary monetary policies in the host country but also 
conditions in their home country affect lending in host countries. Given that emerging markets are more 
volatile, then the presence of foreign banks should have an overall diminishing effect on volatility. Bang 
et al. (2016) find that foreign banks take more risk and this can be due to information asymmetry 
disadvantages, differences between the home and host countries, and importing the financial condition 
of their parent company. If there is a strong institutional framework that diminishes information 
asymmetry and if a foreign bank home country is less volatile than the host country, then we can expect 
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a decreasing effect in volatility derived from the presence of foreign banks. It would be intuitive that in a 
stronger institutional framework, economic agents would be more willing to take risks. However, 
Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011) find that firms in countries with well-developed creditor rights incur 
in less debt. Houston et al. (2010) perform a similar analysis but they focus on lenders and show that 
stronger creditor rights leads to lower bank risk. Mathur and Marcelin (2015) also find that better 
institutions reduce risk and improve capital allocation. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Foreign banks will have a positive effect on bank’s commercial, consumption, and housing 
loans.  
If foreign banks can obtain capital from their home countries and there is a strong institutional 
framework in the host country, foreign banks should promote economic growth by allocating capital. 
Goldberg et al. (2000) argue that due to their parent companies, foreign banks should facilitate the 
inflow of capital. De Haas and Lelyveld (2010) find that foreign banks with strong parent banks provide 
credit more rapidly. However, Haber, and Musacchio (2005) claim that foreign banks do not provide 
commercial loans when there is a weak enforcement of contracts. Schulz (2006) find that the low impact 
of foreign banks in Mexico is more related to the prevailing level of competition in the Mexican banking 
system. Beck and Martínez Pería (2010) show that credit by foreign banks is a more complicated story. 
In Mexico, foreign banks increased their presence only in rich municipalities which is consistent with the 
cherry picking argument. Gormley (2010) states that foreign banks in India specialize only in the most 
profitable firms. Serrano (2016) divides foreign banks in Mexico by nationality and finds that large 
foreign banks do increase their loans. Given the strong institutions in Chile and bank competitiveness we 
can expect more credit by foreign banks.  
If there are strong institutions protecting creditors, enforcing contracts, and decreasing asymmetric 
information, then banks should be more willing to provide loans. However, the type of lending can differ 
according to the institutional environment. Haber and Musacchio (2005) argue that foreign banks in 
Mexico do not provide commercial loans due to the weak enforcement of contracts. Therefore, banks 
make most of their income from fees and consumption loans. Ergungor (2008) studies the judicial 
system in 46 countries and finds that when there is an inflexible judicial system, the economy grows 
when it is supported by a market-oriented financial system. Hassan, Sanchez, and Yu (2011) find that 
domestic credit helps economic growth in Latin America but it has a negative effect on high-income 
countries. Hsueh, Hu, and Chien-Heng Tu (2013) also find that financial development leads growth in 
Asian countries. However, when studying the link between finance and economic growth across 
different regions, Narayan and Narayan (2013) find that, except in the Middle East, banking has a 
negative effect on economic growth.  Mathur and Marcelin (2015) study the effects of institutional 
development and show that in countries with better institutions banks provide more credit.  
 
4. Data and methodology 
Hand collected financial statement data is available from the Superintendencia de Bancos e 
Instituciones Financieras de Chile. The sample covers the period from 2005 to 2014 and has 245 bank-
year observations. We divide our tests based on the three hypotheses stated in the previous section. 
The dependent variable for efficiency is the net interest margin, NIM, which we calculate as interest 
received minus interest paid divided by total earning assets. The measures for volatility of returns are 
Vol_nim, measured by the standard deviation of net interest margin, and Sd_roa, calculated as the 
standard deviation of returns over assets. The risk measure we use is Ln(Z-score) computed as the 
natural logarithm of the Z-score, which is calculated as the return on assets plus the capital-asset ratio 
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(car) divided by the standard deviation of asset returns [Z-score=(roa+car)/sd_roa]. A higher Z-score 
indicates a higher level of bank stability. Our final hypothesis tests the allocation of credit. The indicators 
that we use are as follows. Commloans is computed as commercial loans divided by total loans, 
Consumloans is consumption loans divided by total loans, and Housloans is measured by housing loans 
divided by total loans. 
The control variables are INST, which is an equal-weighted index that comprises the six Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability and 
absence of violence, voice and accountability, rule of law, and regulatory quality. Foreign is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if firm is foreign. Costeff is equal to administrative expenses divided by assets plus 
deposits. Credit_risk is net loans divided by total assets. Ln(size) is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Inflation is the GDP deflator (annual %) calculated by the World Development Indicators. Ln(dom_cred) 
is the natural logarithm of the domestic credit to private sector by financial intermediaries (% of GDP) 
calculated by the World Development Indicators. Ln(gdpcap) is the natural logarithm of the GDP per 
capita (current US$) calculated by the World Development Indicators. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics. It can be observed from the statistics that the allocation of 
credit can range from zero to 100% of the portfolio, except for housing loans. However, the mean 
commercial loans are 53% whereas consumption and housing loans are around 15%. From the 
correlations in Table 3, there is a negative association between commercial loans and the other two 
categories of loans. This is an indication that certain banks specialize in a specific type of credit 
allocation. Consumption and housing loans are positively correlated, which shows that some banks have 
the general public as their main client. According to Haber and Musacchio (2005), foreign banks in 
Mexico do not provide commercial loans due to the poor enforceability of contracts. From the loan 
allocation, in Chile there appears to be a separation between banks that provide commercial loans and 
banks that specialize in the other two categories of loans. 
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
The net interest margin ratio (NIM) shows that the maximum value is above 10% of earnings and 
can reach negative values if they pay more for interest. However, the mean value is 2% which can be an 
indicator that Chilean banks are conforming to international standards and deriving revenue from fees 
and investments. NIM is also highly correlated with consumer loans, so we can infer that banks that 
specialize in consumer loans are obtaining high revenue from interest rate differential. In contrast, there 
is a negative association between NIM and commercial loans. Possibly banks that specialize in 
commercial loans are providing additional services to compensate for the low interest margin. In terms 
of volatility of returns measured by Vol_nim and Sd_roa, NIM is a more stable measurement than 
returns on assets. Even though they both have the same mean, Sd_roa has twice the standard deviation 
of Vol_nim and a maximum value four times larger than the maximum value of Vol_nim. Ln(Z-score) has 
a range between -0.73 and 5.89 but with a mean of 3.58. This shows that values are more concentrated 
in the upper tail and the standard deviation is about 25% the value of the mean. There are no 
correlations above .5 between Ln(Z-score) and any other variables. 
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
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We use a dynamic panel approach in our analysis to address the endogeneity bias that is a potential 
problem on empirical works on bank profitability as discussed by Naceur and Omran (2011). Guyot et al. 
(2014) argue that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators are less efficient when employed to panel 
datasets because individual effects, if significant, cause correlation between the explanatory variables 
and the error term, occasioning in an upwards bias in the estimation. They add that the use of a fixed 
effects method (FEM) estimator usually eliminates this problem in static models, but not in the case of 
dynamic models, where the correlation between the dependent lagged variable and the individual fixed 
effects biases the estimated parameters downwards.  
In addition, in dynamic panel models both OLS and FEM are inconsistent when the time span is small 
(Nickell, 1981). The generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) is 
widely used in that case. Yet, Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that this estimator suffers from a weak 
instrument problem and propose a system GMM procedure which uses moment conditions based on 
the level equations together with the usual Arellano-Bond orthogonality conditions.  
We adopt the SGMM estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which 
takes into account the unobserved fixed effects, removing them from the equation through first 
differences, and utilizes lagged values of the regressors as instruments, efficiently addressing the 
endogeneity bias. We specify the variable foreign as exogenous in the SGMM model, and assume 
reverse causation from the dependent variable to credit risk, following Tayler and Zilberman (2016) who 
find an endogenous credit risk as the source of financial frictions. In our paper, the idea is that credit risk 
is potentially reversely impacted by changes in bank efficiency, risk factors and credit availability. 
 We follow Roodman (2009) by adopting collapsed instruments in the two-step GMM regressions 
with Windmeijer (2005) correction of standard errors. As result of the collapse, the number of 
instruments is smaller than the number of banks, avoiding the overidentification bias; the Windmeijer 
correction addresses the downward bias of two-step GMM standard errors. In regard to the 
specification tests, we check the validity of instruments and the absence of serial correlation of residuals 
through the Hansen and Arellano-Bond tests, for which the p-values are reported at the bottom of each 
regression table.  
For robustness of results, the dynamic panel model is compared to OLS and FEM, tables are not 
reported. The results support the null hypotheses of no serial correlation and no overidentifying 
restrictions, as shown respectively in the p-values above 0.10 for the AB(2) and the Hansen tests. Since 
these parameters are consistent, results can be interpreted with confidence. 
The linear dynamic panel model used to test our Hypothesis 1 is the following: 
𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡               (1) 
where NIM is the bank’s net interest margin, our dependent variable for efficiency; INST is 
institutional development, Foreign is a dummy that is equal to 1 if the bank is foreign, B is a vector of 
bank-specific characteristics represented by the measures of cost efficiency, credit risk and bank size, M 
is a vector of macroeconomic variables which are inflation and per capita GDP, F is the financial 
development variable which is equivalent to our domestic credit variable,  𝜂 is the vector of unobserved 
fixed effects and 𝜀 is the error term.  
To test Hypothesis 2, we adopt the following linear dynamic panel model: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                (2) 
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where Risk is our dependent variable that measures bank risk, represented alternately by the 
measures of volatility of net interest margin and return on assets; the remaining variables are previously 
described. 
Finally, the third model is used to test Hypothesis 3 which is related to bank loans: 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (3) 
where Loans is the dependent variable that corresponds to bank loans that alternates among 
commercial loans, consumption loans and housing loans; the remaining variables are previously 
described.   
5. Results 
 
5.1 Interest rate spread 
 
The system GMM regressions of the net interest margin are presented in Table 4. Interestingly, in 
model 1 foreign has no significant effect on NIM but when we control for institutional development, 
foreign becomes statistically significant. With a strong institutional background, foreign banks improve 
the competitiveness of the banking sector by decreasing the net interest margin by a factor hovering 
between -0.006 and -0.010. The results are robust for models 2 through 5 when different macro 
variables are used as controls.  
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
 
Inflation decreases the spread but it has a very small magnitude with no statistical significance 
therefore it does not have a major impact that would change the significance of other variables. 
Ln(dom_cred) has a negative coefficient and also decreases the spread and, in regression 4, it modifies 
the effect of size on NIM. After controlling for ln(dom_cred), the size of banks also reduces the NIM by a 
factor of -0.024 and is significant at the 5% level.  The cost efficiency of banks is measured by costeff. A 
higher costeff means that the administrative expenses are increasing relative to assets and deposits, 
therefore the larger the costeff the less efficient the bank. In the first regression, costeff increases the 
interest margin by 0.76 but after controlling for ln(dom_cred) and ln(gdpcap) an increase in expenses 
has a decreasing effect on spreads and the magnitude is between -0.64 and -0.86. The effects of costs 
efficiency are driven by the allocation of credit and GDP per capita, which also generates the same 
effects on size. Banks will provide more domestic credit when the GDP per capita is high and these 
factors are increasing the assets of banks and decreasing their efficiency.  Credit_risk consistently 
increases the spread across all five models but the magnitude of the coefficient is halved to 0.024 when 
ln(dom_cred) and ln(gdpcap) are included. If the bank is providing more loans, it is increasing its risk 
profile and it is compensated with a higher net interest margin. The GDP per capita shows that an 
increase in the population wealth leads to a decrease in the net interest margin with magnitude of -
0.027.  
Even though the main drivers of NIM are the lag of NIM and credit risk, the effect of foreign banks 
when institutions are included is consistent in models 2 through 5. Evidence supports hypothesis 1 once 
it shows that foreign banks improve the efficiency of the banking system. Our results are consistent with 
Peria and Mody (2004), Berger, Hasan, and Zhou (2009), and Jeon, Olivero, and Wu (2011) who also find 
a positive effect from foreign banks. Lensink and Hermes (2004) and Moguillansky, Stuart, and Vergara 
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(2004) argue that the level of economic development is a defining factor that will determine whether a 
bank promotes efficiency or increases the interest rate spreads. Our study in Chile contributes to the 
literature by showing that it is not the level of economic development what determines the behavior of 
foreign banks but rather the presence of strong institutions.  
 
5.2 Volatility of returns and risk 
In Table 5, we are interested in measuring the overall effect of foreign banks in the volatility of the 
net interest margin as stated in hypothesis 2.  The coefficients of the binary variable foreign are 
statistically significant at 5% level in models 2, 3 and 4 with a magnitude varying from -0.005 to -0.009. 
The presence of foreign banks decreases the volatility of the spread the most after accounting for the 
effect of inflation. Institutions are increasing vol_nim and the effect is significant at the 1% level in 
models 2 and 3 with coefficients of 0.061 and 0.092, respectively. From the results obtained, it appears 
that banks will take more risk if the institutions in a country enable property rights and enforceability of 
contracts. We obtain the opposite effects of INST on vol_nim as in previous literature Acharya et al. 
(2011), Houston et al. (2010) and Mathur and Marcelin (2015).  
 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
The effect of inflation on the volatility of NIM is negative with similar magnitude to the impact on 
NIM (Table 4) and the statistical significance is reduced, at the 10% level. Curiously, after accounting for 
inflation, the effect of institutions on the volatility is highest. Costeff increases the volatility in the first 
two models with an average magnitude of 0.392 but after controlling for ln(dom_cred) and ln(gdpcap) 
an increase in expenses has a decreasing effect on volatility as in section 5.1. Interestingly, the GDP per 
capita decreases the volatility of NIM but by a factor of -0.022 and significance at the 5% level. 
The second measure that we use for volatility is the standard deviation in returns on assets. Table 6 
presents similar results that are consistent with Table 5. Foreign consistently shows negative coefficients 
in all the models with high statistical significance. These results provide stronger evidence that foreign 
banks are decreasing the volatility of returns as formulated in hypothesis 2. INST increases volatility in 
models 2, 4 and 5 but it loses significant after controlling for inflation. The main difference between 
both measures of volatility is that with sd_roa, foreign decreases the volatility even without controlling 
for institutional effects. Ln(Size) shows that the larger the bank the less volatile the ROA. Given that size 
is measured by assets it is expected to have the strongest influence on sd_roa. Size is statistically 
significant across all models of Table 5. Ln(dom_cred) and ln(gdpcap) have decreasing effects on 
volatility but only the former is significant at the 10% level with a small coefficient of 0.0002.  Foreign 
banks are reducing the volatility and the results provide some evidence to support hypothesis 2 that 
foreign banks in developing countries serve as a stabilizing agent in the presence of domestic shocks. 
Even though foreign banks are susceptible to the business cycles of their home countries and risks of 
parent companies, they minimize local volatility. However, the results are heavily influenced by the 
dependent variable of choice. In Table 5, foreign banks decrease vol_nim the most in the presence of 
inflation. When the dependent variable is sd_roa, foreign banks consistently decrease the volatility of 
returns across the five models. Goldberg et al. (2000), Peek and Rosengreen (2000), and Bang et al. 
(2016) argue that foreign banks can be a source of instability whereas Wu et al. (2011) state that 
volatility will depend on the conditions in the home and host countries. We provide some evidence that 
in the case of Chile, foreign banks are decreasing volatility. These results should provide some 
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encouragement to governments of developing countries that want to open their banking sector to 
foreign subsidiaries. Furthermore, in the case of a financial crisis, foreign banks can join efforts to 
provide much needed capital to protect the financial system.  
 
 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
Table 7 provides additional evidence that foreign banks are promoting stability in the 
Chilean banking sector. The effect of foreign is statistically significant in all models at the 1% 
level. In general, foreign banks are not exporting volatility from their home countries and are 
enhancing the stability of the system.  Bang et al. (2016) suggest that foreign banks take more risk 
due to information asymmetry disadvantages. In the Chilean case, probably the institutional framework 
decreases the negative consequences of information asymmetry and foreign banks take less risk. 
Consistent with Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011), Houston et al. (2010), and Mathur and Marcelin 
(2015) institutions also strengthen the stability of banks. Interestingly, INST coefficient is not significant 
in any of the models while costeff has large coefficients varying from 67.7 to 124.0 with significance at 
the 1% level, suggesting that banks spend large amounts of capital to maintain stability. It could be 
expected that the size of a bank could serve as a cushion against volatility. However, ln(size) has a 
decreasing effect on ln(Z-score) but it is only significant at the 10% level when controlling for 
ln(dom_cred). It is not clear if larger banks are taking more risk, a result that indicates that size is 
secondary to the impact of foreign. Inflation is decreasing the stability of banks with a magnitude of        
-0.025. Ln(dom_cred) and ln(gdpcap) have increasing effects on stability, which is the opposite effect 
from Tables 5 and 6. Overall, Table 7 provides further evidence that foreign banks and institutions are 
increasing the stability of the banking sector, which is congruent with hypothesis 2. 
 
 
 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
 
 
5.3 Lending portfolio. 
 
The last set of tests focus on the role of banks as a financial intermediary in the economy, where 
banks not only capture capital but also allocate it in different areas. Table 8 presents the effects of 
foreign banks on commercial loans. These results are of significant importance to the development of 
the economy in emerging markets. Foreign banks have a positive effect on commercial loan, which 
provides some  evidence to support hypothesis 3. All models are statistically significant at the 1 or 5% 
level and with magnitudes from 0.034 to 0.137. When a country such as Chile has strong institutions, 
foreign banks perform their role as agents of growth by providing commercial loans.  
In the case of institutions, models 2 and 4 show that institutions help to increase the level of 
commercial loans with a high average magnitude of 2.41. The results show the opposite effect in 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3211592 
15 
 
regression 5 when ln(gdpcap)is accounted for, although the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
From the correlations table, we observe the negative interaction between credit_risk and commercial 
loans but positive correlation between credit_risk and consumer and housing loans. The nature of this 
interaction is observed by the negative and statistically significant coefficient of credit_risk across most 
models and with a very high magnitude. It appears that banks specialize in providing either commercial 
loans or the other two types of loans. Ln(Size) indicates that the largest banks have a negative effect on 
commercial loans, probably they can derive their income from fees or other loans. Smaller banks can 
focus on commercial loans and in the presence of strong institutions, if there is a nonperforming loan 
they will be able to recover their collateral or have the contract enforced. Ln(dom_cred) and ln(gdpcap) 
have negative effects on commercial loans and both variables are significant at  the 1% level.  
 
 [Insert Table 8 Here]  
 
There is some evidence on Table 9 consistent with the implications of hypotheses 3. In the five 
regressions, foreign is positive and statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level and the average 
coefficient magnitude is on a par with Table 8. Institutions also are positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level in all models but its magnitude is only one third as compared to Table 8. Institutions 
facilitate consumption loans and foreign banks also provide consumption loans.  Costeff has a positive 
and significant effect in the first three models and its magnitude varies between 0.561 and 1.212. The 
variable credit_risk has a negative effect on consumption loans, consistently with the effect from Table 8 
and provides more evidence of bank specialization. Ln(Size) has the opposite effect than it does on 
commercial loans, having the largest banks an increasing effect on consumption loans but the 
magnitude is one fifth as compared to its coefficient with commercial loans. Inflation is positively related 
to consumption loans, which may indicate that people are borrowing more in dollar terms and banks are 
providing these funds. Ln(dom_cred) has negative effect on consumption loan with the same small 
coefficient of -0.001 from Table 8 with significance at the 1% level. However, ln(gdpcap) has positive 
impact on consumption loans, which has the opposite sign than with commercial loans. It appears that 
as the economy grows, banks focus more on consumption loans. However, the positive coefficient of 
0.07 on consumer loans is much smaller than the negative coefficients observed with commercial loans. 
The results are pointing towards a segmented banking sector where large banks focus on consumption 
and smaller banks are focusing on commercial loans. The negative correlation between credit_risk and 
commercial loans provides more evidence that there is specialization in the Chilean banking sector. 
However, given the strong institutions in the country, foreign banks are improving competition and 
complementing the allocation of capital by the local banks. 
 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
 
Table 10 measures the effects of foreign banks on housing loans. Foreign does not seem to have a 
strong impact on housing loans, showing only one coefficient with statistical significance at the 10% 
level with a negative sign in regression 2. Foreign banks have a much greater influence in providing 
commercial and consumption loans than housing loans. This table provides mixed evidence with regards 
to hypothesis 3, which may be due to having fewer observations and the impact of the 2007-2009 crisis 
on the real estate market. INST increases housing loans across all models. Costeff has a negative and 
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significant effect in all models; the increase in expenses is decreasing the allocation of real estate loans. 
Ln(Size) is not statistically significant in most regressions, indicating that the largest banks are focusing 
on housing and consumption loans. Inflation and domestic credit have small coefficients although with 
significance at the 1% level with respectively positive and negative impacts on housing loans, similarly to 
the effects on consumption loans. The remaining control variables have similar effects as with 
commercial loans, although inflation is positive and highly significant, in line with the result for 
consumption loans.  
 
 
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
 
The last three tests provide evidence that corroborates hypothesis 3, foreign banks are increasing 
the overall loans in Chile. However, if we compare the magnitude and significance of the regression 
coefficients, foreign banks have a larger effect on commercial and consumption loans than on housing 
loans. Consistent with Haber and Musacchio’s (2005) claim that foreign banks do not provide credit in 
Mexico due to weak institutions, the case of Chile provides evidence that, in the presence of strong 
institutions, foreign banks have a very strong impact on the allocation of commercial and consumption 
credit. Even though Chile does not have the economic development level of an OECD country, its strong 
institutions facilitate the large provision of commercial and consumption loans by foreign banks.   
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we study the effects of foreign banks on the Chilean banking system. Focusing on a 
developing country with strong institutions permits us to control for several variables like 
macroeconomic heterogeneity, uncorrelated business cycles, culture, and other factors that may render 
our results invalid. The studies that measure the effects of foreign banks have found contradicting 
results. Of our particular interest is the article by Haber and Musacchio (2005), who argue that foreign 
banks do not provide commercial loans in Mexico due to weak institutions. The Chilean case provides a 
suitable experiment to test this argument. In the presence of strong institutions, we find that foreign 
banks do have a positive effect on the allocation of commercial and consumption credit. After 
controlling for size, we also observe that large banks provide consumption loans while the small banks 
specialize in commercial loans. Furthermore, the correlations table provides more evidence of 
complementary services. There is a group of banks that provides commercial loans and another group of 
banks that provides consumption loans. 
We also contribute to the literature of foreign banks in emerging markets by providing further 
evidence that foreign banks increase the competitiveness of the banking sector by reducing the interest 
rate spread. The selection of Chile as a case study proved particularly helpful to obtain these results. 
Foreign banks by themselves are not statistically significant in the reduction of the net interest margin. 
However, after controlling for institutions, the effect of foreign banks is highly significant. Furthermore, 
the results are robust to several macroeconomic controls. In terms of the volatility of returns, foreign 
banks consistently reduce the standard deviation of ROA. When we study the standard deviation of the 
net interest margin, we observe that foreign banks decrease volatility across all regressions. The results 
obtained from measuring the z-score show that foreign banks help to stabilize banks in Chile. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3211592 
17 
 
In general, in the presence of strong institutions, foreign banks are a source of economic stability 
that enhances the competitiveness in the banking sector. Even though foreign banks decrease the 
interest spread, banks are still providing a diversified lending portfolio. Rather than foreign banks 
searching for high rents, there is a complementarity of financial services. These results confirm the 
clustering of banks based on business characteristics that benefit most Chileans. These findings have 
important implications for public policies in developing countries. Governments should focus on 
improving the institutions in their countries in order to benefit from the presence of foreign banks. 
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Table 2                   
Summary Statistics                 
Variable Obs.   Mean   
Std. 
Dev. 
  Minimum   Maximum 
INST 245   1.17   0.04   1.12   1.24 
commloans 232   0.53   0.30   0   1 
consumloans 233   0.16   0.26   0   0.99 
housloans 161   0.12   0.12   0   0.38 
NIM 245   0.02   0.02   -0.01   0.12 
costeff 245   0.01   0.01   0   0.08 
ln(Z-score) 243  3.58  0.91  -0.73  5.89 
vol_nim 243   0.01   0.01   0   0.06 
sd_roa 243   0.01   0.02   0   0.25 
npl 236   0.03   0.04   0   0.19 
ln credit_risk 245   0.71   1.62   0   24.94 
ln(size) 245   7.63   1.92   3.44   10.86 
inflation 245   5.15   3.70   0.47   12.81 
ln(dom_cred) 222   4.58   0.14   4.37   4.75 
ln(gdpcap) 222   9.34   0.23   8.94   9.66 
INST is an equal-weighted index that comprises the six Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) control of 
corruption, government effectiveness, political stability and absence of violence, voice and accountability, 
rule of law and regulatory quality, and voice and accountability. Commloans are commercial loans divided by 
total loans. Consumloans are the consumption loans divided by total loans. Housloans are the housing loans 
divided by total loans. Nim is equal to (Interest received−interest paid)/ total earning assets. Costeff is equal 
to Administrative Expenses/(Assets+Deposits). Ln(Z-score) is the natural logarithm of the Z-score, which is 
calculated as the return on assets plus the capital-asset ratio (car) divided by the standard deviation of asset 
returns [Z-score=(roa+car)/sd_roa]. Vol_nim is the standard deviation of net interest margin over the period 
2005–2014. Sd_roa is the standard deviation of return over assets over the period 2005–2014. Credit_risk is 
net loans divided by total assets. Ln(size) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Inflation is the GDP deflator 
(annual %) calculated by the World Development Indicators. Ln(dom_cred) is the natural logarithm of the 
domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP). Ln(gdpcap) is the natural logarithm of the GDP per 
capita (current US$) calculated by the World Development Indicators. 
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Table 4 
Net Interest Margin           
            
Dependent variable: nimt Estimation: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond (System GMM) 
dynamic panel       
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
      
foreignt -0.003 -0.006
b
 -0.006
c
 -0.006
a
 -0.010
a
 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
            
INSTt   0.103
a
 0.121
a
 0.027
c
 0.074
a
 
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) 
nimt-1 0.247
a
 0.227
c
 0.157 0.004 0.004 
  (0.036) (0.126) (0.120) (0.075) (0.089) 
costefft 0.764 0.511 0.458 -0.864
c
 -0.635 
  (0.464) (0.513) (0.549) (0.500) (0.512) 
credit_riskt 0.057
a
 0.071
a
 0.077
a
 0.023
a
 0.024
a
 
  (0.003) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) 
ln(size)t 0.026
b
 0.025
a
 0.025
c
 -0.024
b
 -0.015 
  (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.019) 
ln(size)
2
t -0.002
a
 -0.002
a
 -0.002
b
 0.002
b
 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
inflationt     -0.0003     
      (<0.001)     
ln(dom_cred)t       -0.0003
a
   
        (<0.001)   
ln(gdpcap)t         -0.027
a
 
          (0.009) 
Constant -0.080
c
 -0.190
a
 -0.210
a
 0.085 0.212 
  (0.043) (0.059) (0.067) (0.069) (0.135) 
            
Hansen (p-value) 0.169 0.188 0.302 0.689 0.149 
AR (2) 0.957 0.642 0.630 0.169 0.115 
Number of instruments 22 22 22 20 20 
Wald Chi
2
 63.7 29.1 34.8 89.8 81.0 
Observations 215 215 215 192 192 
      
Note: Windmeijer standard errors are shown in parentheses. Superscripts a, b and c: 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
levels of significance, respectively. We specify the variable foreign as an exogenous variable in the model 
and address the endogeneity bias by controlling for the potential reverse causation from the dependent 
variable to credit risk. We follow Roodman (2009) by adopting collapsed instruments to avoid the 
overidentification bias in the two-step GMM procedure. All other variables are explained in Table 2. 
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Table 5           
Volatility of Net Interest Margin         
            
Dependent variable: vol_nimt Estimation: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond (System GMM) 
dynamic panel       
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
      
foreignt -0.005
c
 -0.008
b
 -0.009
b
 -0.005
b
 -0.006
c
 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
            
INSTt   0.061
a
 0.092
a
 -0.002 0.026
c
 
    (0.011) (0.016) (0.009) (0.015) 
vol_nimt-1 0.147
a
 0.069 -0.102 0.029 0.004 
  (0.036) (0.067) (0.071) (0.060) (0.112) 
costefft 0.474
a
 0.310
b
 0.122 -0.169
c
 -0.047 
  (0.143) (0.155) (0.133) (0.089) (0.114) 
credit_riskt 0.037
a
 0.050
a
 0.065
a
 -0.014 -0.017 
  (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.019) 
ln(size)t 0.014 0.014 0.016 -0.019 -0.011 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) (0.027) 
ln(size)
2
t -0.001
c
 -0.001
c
 -0.002
c
 0.002 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
inflationt     -0.0004
c
     
      (<0.001)     
ln(dom_cred)t       -0.0002
b
   
        (<0.001)   
ln(gdpcap)t         -0.022
b
 
          (0.009) 
Constant -0.030 -0.100
c
 -0.130
a
 0.096 0.212 
  (0.043) (0.053) (0.046) (0.065) (0.161) 
            
Hansen (p-value) 0.171 0.121 0.108 0.544 0.402 
AR (2) 0.936 0.244 0.365 0.331 0.469 
Number of instruments 22 22 22 20 20 
Wald Chi
2
 27.3 31.7 25.6 21.0 17.7 
Observations 215 215 215 192 192 
      
Note: Windmeijer-corrected GMM standard errors are shown in parentheses. Superscripts a, b and c: 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels of significance, respectively. We specify the variable foreign as an 
exogenous variable in the model and address the endogeneity bias by controlling for the potential 
reverse causation from the dependent variable to credit risk. We follow Roodman (2009) by adopting 
collapsed instruments to avoid the overidentification bias in the two-step GMM procedure. All other 
variables are explained in Table 2. 
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Table 6           
Volatility of Return on Assets         
            
Dependent variable: sd_roat Estimation: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond (System GMM) 
dynamic panel       
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
      
foreignt -0.012
a
 -0.014
a
 -0.010
a
 -0.010
a
 -0.010
a
 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
            
INSTt   0.054
a
 -0.022 0.053
a
 0.043
b
 
    (0.011) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) 
sd_roat-1 0.099
a
 0.113
a
 0.089
c
 0.092
b
 0.103
a
 
  (0.015) (0.021) (0.047) (0.045) (0.038) 
costefft -3.917
a
 -4.180
a
 -2.673
a
 -1.838
a
 -2.664
a
 
  (0.143) (0.195) (0.131) (0.083) (0.113) 
credit_riskt 0.001 0.008 -0.010 -0.017 -0.015 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015) (0.024) 
ln(size)t -0.078
a
 -0.075
a
 -0.096
a
 -0.062
a
 -0.055
a
 
  (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.010) 
ln(size)
2
t 0.005
a
 0.005
a
 0.0069
a
 0.005
a
 0.004
a
 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
inflationt     0.001
a
     
      (<0.001)     
ln(dom_cred)t       -0.0002
c
   
        (<0.001)   
ln(gdpcap)t         -0.002 
          (0.009) 
Constant 0.296
a
 0.228
a
 0.360
a
 0.179
a
 0.177
c
 
  (0.043) (0.045) (0.063) (0.035) (0.094) 
            
Hansen (p-value) 0.153 0.160 0.148 0.128 0.165 
AR (2) 0.499 0.445 0.679 0.764 0.611 
Number of instruments 22 22 22 20 20 
Wald Chi
2
 14.6 39.9 265.4 61.2 44.6 
Observations 213 213 213 190 190 
      
Note: Windmeijer standard errors are shown in parentheses. Superscripts a, b and c: 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10 levels of significance, respectively. We specify the variable foreign as an exogenous variable in 
the model and address the endogeneity bias by controlling for the potential reverse causation from 
the dependent variable to credit risk. We follow Roodman (2009) by adopting collapsed instruments 
to avoid the overidentification bias in the two-step GMM procedure. All other variables are explained 
in Table 2. 
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Table 7           
Ln Z-Score t+1         
            
Dependent variable: Ln_zscoret+1 Estimation: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond (System GMM) 
dynamic panel       
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
      
foreignt 0.487
a
 0.484
a
 0.695
a
 0.549
a
 1.139
a
 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) 
            
INSTt   -0.117 1.103 -0.936 -3.048 
    (0.868) (1.075) (1.313) (1.607) 
lnzscoret -0.362
c
 -0.362
c
 -0.384 -0.398 -0.345 
  (0.200) (0.198) (0.307) (0.764) (0.950) 
costefft 67.71
a
 68.18
a
 98.59
a
 73.28
a
 124.0
a
 
  (0.344) (0.515) (0.517) (0.422) (0.686) 
credit_riskt -1.805 -1.827 -0.910 -0.024 2.198 
  (1.209) (1.262) (2.293) (2.011) (5.139) 
ln(size)t -0.288 -0.275 0.646 -0.595
c
 0.378 
  (0.265) (0.413) (0.430) (0.327) (0.795) 
ln(size)
2
t 0.005 0.005 -0.0676 0.010 -0.092 
  (0.026) (0.041) (0.043) (0.034) (0.094) 
inflationt     -0.025
a
     
      (<0.001)     
ln(dom_cred)t       0.006
a
   
        (<0.001)   
ln(gdpcap)t         1.854
a
 
          (0.009) 
Constant 7.142
a
 7.219
a
 2.796
a
 8.767
a
 -8.175
a
 
  (0.043) (0.057) (0.062) (0.054) (0.214) 
            
Hansen (p-value) 0.550 0.464 0.747 0.379 0.403 
AR (2) 0.214 0.233 0.294 0.283 0.494 
Number of instruments 22 22 22 20 20 
Wald Chi
2
 15.6 17.3 20.8 22.5 21.7 
Observations 213 213 213 213 213 
      
Note: Windmeijer standard errors are shown in parentheses. Superscripts a, b and c: 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10 levels of significance, respectively. We specify the variable foreign as an exogenous variable in 
the model and address the endogeneity bias by controlling for the potential reverse causation from 
the dependent variable to credit risk. We follow Roodman (2009) by adopting collapsed instruments 
to avoid the overidentification bias in the two-step GMM procedure. All other variables are explained 
in Table 2. 
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Table 8           
Commercial loans           
            
Dependent variable: commloanst Estimation: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond (System GMM) 
dynamic panel       
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
      
foreignt 0.203
a
 0.137
a
 0.034
b
 0.035
b
 0.092
a
 
  (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.021) 
            
INSTt   2.227
c
 0.913 2.594
c
 -1.858 
    (1.241) (4.060) (1.514) (1.460) 
commloanst-1 0.328
a
 0.327
a
 0.333
a
 0.365
a
 0.343
a
 
  (0.036) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050) (0.065) 
costefft -74.86
a
 -83.13
a
 -75.61
a
 -17.49
a
 1.375 
  (0.344) (0.442) (0.488) (0.778) (1.347) 
credit_riskt -1.364
a
 -1.663
a
 -1.167 -2.570
c
 -2.972
a
 
  (0.242) (0.325) (0.746) (1.392) (0.611) 
ln(size)t -0.965
a
 -1.136
a
 -1.057
a
 -0.609 -0.408 
  (0.265) (0.362) (0.370) (0.487) (0.881) 
ln(size)
2
t 0.075
a
 0.091b 0.083
b
 0.069 0.060 
  (0.026) (0.037) (0.039) (0.049) (0.093) 
inflationt     -0.005
a
     
      (<0.001)     
ln(dom_cred)t       -0.001
a
   
        (<0.001)   
ln(gdpcap)t         -0.198
a
 
          (0.009) 
Constant 4.776
a
 7.854
a
 5.962
a
 6.018
a
 6.013
a
 
  (0.043) (0.056) (0.087) (0.080) (0.265) 
            
Hansen (p-value) 0.371 0.248 0.487 0.236 0.409 
AR (2) 0.355 0.174 0.244 0.210 0.268 
Number of instruments 22 22 22 20 20 
Wald Chi
2
 25.0 16.8 24.7 32.3 28.0 
Observations 203 203 203 181 181 
      
Note: Windmeijer standard errors are shown in parentheses. Superscripts a, b and c: 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10 levels of significance, respectively. We specify the variable foreign as an exogenous variable in 
the model and address the endogeneity bias by controlling for the potential reverse causation from 
the dependent variable to credit risk. We follow Roodman (2009) by adopting collapsed instruments 
to avoid the overidentification bias in the two-step GMM procedure. All other variables are explained 
in Table 2. 
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Table 9           
Consumption loans           
            
Dependent variable: consumloanst Estimation: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond (System GMM) 
dynamic panel       
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
      
foreignt 0.063
b
 0.109
a
 0.133
a
 0.079
a
 0.073
b
 
  (0.026) (0.029) (0.022) (0.020) (0.032) 
            
INSTt   0.803
a
 0.748
a
 1.047
a
 0.705
a
 
    (0.022) (0.032) (0.036) (0.042) 
consumloanst-1 0.474
a
 0.502
a
 0.549
a
 0.623
a
 0.577
a
 
  (0.036) (0.047) (0.094) (0.112) (0.108) 
costefft 0.561
a
 1.212
a
 0.743
b
 0.091 -0.035 
  (0.202) (0.437) (0.307) (2.013) (3.036) 
credit_riskt -0.101
a
 -0.136
a
 -0.202
a
 -0.065 0.001 
  (0.012) (0.039) (0.038) (0.048) (0.055) 
ln(size)t 0.170
a
 0.187
a
 0.079 0.155
b
 0.227
a
 
  (0.012) (0.030) (0.078) (0.066) (0.034) 
ln(size)
2
t -0.011
a
 -0.013
a
 -0.005 -0.011
b
 -0.018
a
 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
inflationt     0.003
a
     
      (<0.001)     
ln(dom_cred)t       -0.001
a
   
        (<0.001)   
ln(gdpcap)t         0.070
a
 
          (0.009) 
Constant -0.470
a
 -1.300
a
 -0.890
a
 -1.490
a
 -1.990
a
 
  (0.043) (0.182) (0.326) (0.291) (0.313) 
            
Hansen (p-value) 0.259 0.152 0.105 0.108 0.131 
AR (2) 0.461 0.472 0.269 0.407 0.484 
Number of instruments 22 22 22 20 20 
Wald Chi
2
 96.1 459.2 393.2 814.1 489.8 
Observations 201 201 201 179 179 
      
Note: Windmeijer standard errors are shown in parentheses. Superscripts a, b and c: 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10 levels of significance, respectively. We specify the variable foreign as an exogenous variable in 
the model and address the endogeneity bias by controlling for the potential reverse causation from 
the dependent variable to credit risk. We follow Roodman (2009) by adopting collapsed instruments 
to avoid the overidentification bias in the two-step GMM procedure. All other variables are explained 
in Table 2. 
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Table 10           
Housing loans           
            
Dependent variable: housloanst Estimation: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond (System GMM) 
dynamic panel       
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
      
foreignt -0.055 -0.061
c
 -0.047 0.031 0.024 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.070) (0.060) 
            
INSTt   0.270
a
 -0.009 0.160
a
 0.345
a
 
    (0.022) (0.047) (0.061) (0.081) 
housloanst-1 0.537
a
 0.526
a
 0.578
a
 0.036 0.105 
  (0.036) (0.041) (0.065) (0.070) (0.080) 
costefft -3.228
a
 -3.374
a
 -3.298
a
 -0.903
b
 -0.991
a
 
  (0.344) (0.269) (0.538) (0.444) (0.308) 
credit_riskt -0.174
a
 -0.144
a
 -0.155
a
 0.093 0.088 
  (0.012) (0.019) (0.022) (0.145) (0.178) 
ln(size)t -0.039 -0.058
b
 -0.042 0.041 0.013 
  (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.049) (0.044) 
ln(size)
2
t 0.003
c
 0.004
c
 0.003 -0.0003 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
inflationt     0.003
a
     
      (<0.001)     
ln(dom_cred)t       -0.002
a
   
        (<0.001)   
ln(gdpcap)t         -0.047
a
 
          (0.009) 
Constant 0.290
a
 0.035 0.286
a
 -0.233 -0.099 
  (0.043) (0.046) (0.079) (0.172) (0.152) 
            
Hansen (p-value) 0.3600 0.1900 0.2440 0.5300 0.5780 
AR (2) 0.2290 0.1690 0.2460 0.2080 0.2440 
Number of instruments 19 19 19 17 17 
Wald Chi
2
 81.8 152.7 95.4 128.8 116.0 
Observations 134 134 134 112 112 
      
Note: Windmeijer standard errors are shown in parentheses. Superscripts a, b and c: 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10 levels of significance, respectively. We specify the variable foreign as an exogenous variable in 
the model and address the endogeneity bias by controlling for the potential reverse causation from 
the dependent variable to credit risk. We follow Roodman (2009) by adopting collapsed instruments 
to avoid the overidentification bias in the two-step GMM procedure. All other variables are explained 
in Table 2. 
 
        
 
